When the Fog of War Gets Even Foggier — 3/9/26

It’s long been said that generals always prepare to fight the last war, especially if they won it. It appears that presidents do the same thing. At least this one does.

To be fair, most of us tend to be victims of our own success. When a certain approach to a task—at work, at home, or in school—accomplishes our desired goal, we tend to stick with it even when the surrounding circumstances change. This is what Donald Trump is now doing in Iran.

Trump knows that the US military was able to remove Nicolás Maduro from power in Venezuela quickly and efficiently earlier this year. He remembers how joining in the Israeli attacks against Iran last summer required only a short amount of time. Going back further, he often points to the assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani that he ordered during his first term in office and scoffs at those who warned that Soleimani’s death would lead to violent reprisals. In his mind, war simply does not take much time. And he can get back to talking about borders and mocking affordability fairly soon.

Much like Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s assumption that his invasion of Ukraine four years ago would be no more complicated than his previous capture of Crimea, Trump seems to be projecting his past actions into a much different and much more daunting challenge. Iran is more than three times the size of Venezuela with an entrenched theocracy that is much less fragile than Maduro’s hollowed-out government. Achieving the regime change that Trump and his advisors frequently reference would require a far wider, deeper, and longer-lasting offensive than his previous forays.

How difficult would regime change actually be? According to U.S. Army strategic protocols, this type of counterinsurgency doctrine would require 20 to 25 troops for every 1,000 inhabitants of the impacted country to achieve stability. Iran’s population of approximately 93 million people would entail deploying 1.9 million servicepersons—which comprises almost all the US military’s combined active duty, reserve, and National Guard personnel. 

That is hard to see happening. So after originally calling for a populist revolt against what he called a “sick and sinister” Iranian government that slaughtered thousands of protesters, Trump talks frequently about his decision to allow most of the Maduro government to stay in place in Venezuela in exchange for increased compliance with the US. Last Friday, he said he would be happy if Iran was led by members of the Khamenei autocracy after the war, as long as the new leadership treated the United States and Israel “fairly.”

But at the same time, Trump has also indicated that he deserves a role in selecting Iran’s new leader, specifically pointing to the late Ayatollah’s son Mojtaba as an unacceptable option. When Iran’s Council of Experts announced the younger Khamenei as the country’s third Supreme Leader since the 1979 revolution, there was no way to know whether they were thumbing their nose at Trump in defiance or whether a deal had been cut under which Mojtaba would use defiant rhetoric to distract from a more cooperative approach with the US.

A related and equally important unknown factor in Mojtaba’s selection is which of Iran’s various power centers that have emerged since his father’s death orchestrated this outcome. The nation’s military leaders have all but ignored President Masoud Pezeshkian in his efforts to steer their attacks away from Gulf Arab states. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has been far more visible as a spokesperson to international media than either Pezeshkian or the other members of the three-person Interim Leadership Council that was ostensibly in charge until Mojtaba was named.

It may turn out that Mojtaba was the preferred alternative of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard leadership, calculating that a religious figure would be more acceptable to the Iranian people and better positioned to maintain the international Shi’ite leadership role that comes with the job. We don’t yet know whether the new regime will be driven primarily by religious or military considerations. But in either case, the country’s leaders show no indication of backing down. Which means that the US may be in Iran for a much longer time than Trump anticipated a week ago.

But Trump can also define “unconditional surrender” in any way he chooses. So if the financial or military costs get too high (the price of oil hit $100 per barrel on Sunday night), he can simply declare victory, bring the troops home and move on to his next adventure in Cuba.