When FOMO Drives Foreign Policy - 6/23/25

Donald Trump has taken an extraordinary and probably correct but possibly unnecessary risk in bombing Iran. The question is what made him decide to roll the dice?

Two weeks ago, Trump was lecturing Benjamin Netanyahu about the reasons not to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. A few days after that, when Netanyahu did just that, the Trump Administration released a statement—not from the president but from Secretary of State Marco Rubio—distancing the US from Israel’s aerial strikes.

But by the following morning, once it became apparent that Israel had succeeded in neutralizing Iranian defenses, Trump became much more enthusiastic, claiming, “We now have complete and total control of the skies of Iran.” Despite the fact that there was no evidence that the American military had been involved in the Israeli onslaught, Trump was clearly looking for a way to associate himself with the triumph. 

As the days passed and the two countries continued to trade missile fire, Trump emphasized his preference for a diplomatic solution. But by last Wednesday, when he announced that he was issuing an “ultimate ultimatum” to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the following day, when he promised a decision on military action within two weeks, it was clear that the president was itching for action. When Iran rebuffed his offer to fly to Turkey to meet with their leaders himself, there was no way that Trump was going to be content watching this historic drama unfold from the sidelines.

The risks are considerable. The American presidents who preceded Trump were all very aware that while Iran was no match for the US in a traditional military encounter, the Iranians are masters at asymmetrical warfare. Their security forces have shown little hesitancy in the past to employ their missiles, militias, and terrorist proxies to cause great harm to their adversaries (including the United States). So even what appears as of this writing to be a successful attack on the most secure aspects of Iran’s nuclear program carries with it tremendous potential for damaging retribution.

Aware of the likelihood of a violent Iranian response, Trump and his advisors have gone to great lengths to make sure the mullahs understood the very specific and targeted goals of the bombings did not include regime change. Vice President J.D. Vance went on television the next morning, where he asserted, “We’re not at war with Iran. We’re at war with Iran’s nuclear program.” It’s unlikely that the Iranians will see the distinction, but Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth followed up in his Pentagon briefing that “the scope of this was intentionally limited.”

Trump himself framed Iran’s choice in more ominous terms in his address to the nation, warning, “There will be either peace, or there will be tragedy for Iran, far greater than we have witnessed over the last eight days.” But all of these efforts were designed to convince Khamenei that he would be much wiser to accept the loss of his country’s nuclear capability and shift to diplomacy rather than provoking further US military action by launching against American interests or allies.

Even though Iran’s security forces have been greatly diminished by Israel over the last two weeks, they still possess many weapons that could inflict great damage. The prospect of missile attacks on US military bases in the region is considerable, the possibility that Iranian ships could choke the world’s oil supply by closing the Strait of Hormuz is real, and there is ample precedent for targeted kidnappings, hostage-taking, and cyberwarfare.

Make no mistake about it: the Middle East and the world are safer as a result of Trump’s action. And the president deserves credit for lulling Iran’s leaders into a false sense of security with his “two week” statement and his decision to deploy a decoy B-2 bomber in the opposite direction of the planes actually used in the assault. But while the opportunity to strike was especially enticing given the compromised state of Iran’s defenses, Israeli sources were also letting it be known that they were prepared to continue and expand their raids with or without US assistance.

We’ll never know if such efforts from the IDF could have succeeded without greater American firepower. But Trump certainly would not have wanted to watch another world leader receive credit for eliminating the Iranian nuclear threat. So being part of the action – and sharing the credit – may have been too enticing a lure for him to resist.